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Conceptions of Religion
in the Secular State:
Evolving Turkish Secularism
Seval Yildirim*
In 1689, John Locke, a philosopher of liberalism, wrote:
“[t]he Care therefore of every man’s Soul belongs unto himself, and
is to be left unto himself. . . . The Publick Good is the Rule and
Measure of all Law-making. . . . The only business of the Church is
the Salvation of Souls.”1
Locke’s delegation of matters of faith to the Church, matters of public
good to the state, and the care of the soul to the individual, forms the basis of
contemporary liberal democracy. Locke’s vision has an easily identifiable
binary between the State, that is and must remain secular on the one hand,
and the Church, that is religious on the other. Time and experience has
proven that Locke’s simplistic binary was, at best, specific to Christian
Europe at the time and does not adequately explain other contexts. Even in
countries like the United Kingdom or the United States, where Locke’s ideas
have been adopted into law,2 the relationship between religiosity and
secularity is anything but simple and the boundaries between the religious
and the secular are anything but clear. From the difficulties in defining what
constitutes public good to balancing the potentially conflicting demands of
various factions of society, the liberal democratic state continues to grapple

* Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Professor of Law, Whittier Law School.
1. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 35, 39 (James H. Tully ed., Hackett
Publ’g Co. 2010) (1689).
2. For example, The United States Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The United Kingdom is a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights, which
provides a right to freedom of religion. European Convention on Human Rights, art. 9, Nov. 4,
1950, E.T.S. No. 5.
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with the myriad issues secularism raises. This short comment identifies
some of these problems and critiques certain points in current discourse on
religion in the secular state.
Much of the current discourse on secularism accepts that there is a clear
distinction between the secular and the religious. Used as both nouns and
adjectives, religious and secular are terms often left undefined beyond
dictionary definitions.3 For example, what characteristics must an individual
have to be religious or secular? What if I believe in a religion, practice the
mandates of my faith dutifully, but think that an ideal state is one that both
protects my religious liberties from undue interference and simultaneously
refrains from interfering in my religious community’s internal affairs? Does
it suffice to conclude that I am privately religious but believe in a secular
government? What if my faith mandates that I believe in a government that
remains free of any religious affiliation and I am born in a country where the
government already fulfills my religious view? In other words, what if I
believe in a secular government as a religious necessity? Though the
questions may be complex, one thing is clear—religion has framed the
discourse. Whether we speak of religiosity or secularity, religion is
necessarily at the center of how we define our polities, governments, and
individual identities. To that extent, demanding that there be a clear binary
between religiosity and secularity is simplistic and often fails to explain, or
even define, the reality on the ground.
The development of secularism in the Republic of Turkey provides a
good example of the complexities of the religion and state relationship.
Among Muslim-majority countries, Turkey was the first to declare itself a
secular state in its constitution.4 Secularism, or laiklik, is one of the
unalterable principles in the Turkish Constitution.5 Initially a top-down
3. But cf. Seval Yildirim, Expanding Secularism’s Scope: An Indian Case Study, 52 AM. J.
COMP. L. 901 (2004) (discussing different definitions and systems of secularism).
4. The declaration of Islam as the state religion was removed from the constitution in 1928 and
secularism was added as a constitutional principle in 1937. Talip Kucukcan, Sacralization of the
State and Secular Nationalism: Foundations of Civil Religion in Turkey, 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L.
REV. 963, 973–75 (2010). However, the separation of religion from the state, i.e. the process of
secularization can be traced back to the later stages of the Ottoman Empire. The delay in eliminating
the official recognition of Islam as the state religion should be viewed as the product of negotiation
between various factions within the nation-building elite.
5. See Seval Yildirim, Aftermath of a Revolution: A Case Study of Turkish Family Law, 17
PACE INT’L L. REV. 347 (2005) [hereinafter Yildirim, Aftermath of a Revolution] (discussing facts
and details of Turkish secularism); Seval Yildirim, The Search for Shared Idioms: Contesting Views
of Laiklik Before the Turkish Constitutional Court, in MUSLIM SOCIETIES AND THE CHALLENGE OF
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implementation by the nation-building elite, Turkish secularism has evolved
to include expressions of religion in public space, which would have been
unthinkable in earlier eras of the Turkish Republic.6 Indeed, since its birth
in 1923, the Turkish Republic’s history clearly demonstrates that secularism
and secularization are two distinct concepts, which do not necessarily
coincide.7 The top-down implemented Turkish secularization project
consisted of demolishing certain state structures (such as the Caliphate, the
leadership of the Sunni Muslims), and importing European ones, including
European legal codes.8
Despite the rigor of this secularization project, the people of the new
nation lacked a secular consciousness. They had not experienced their
version of Enlightenment, where the church and state relationship had been a
subject of discourse—at least in no similar terms to what had occurred in
Europe.9 Emerging out of the Ottoman Empire, where the head of the
political state and the religious order was one and the same, the Sultan, the
people of Turkey were told to be secular and to reformulate their identities
accordingly—all in the name of modernization and secularity.10 For
example, the 1928 alphabet reform abrogated the Ottoman Arabic alphabet
and adopted a modified version of the Latin alphabet.11 My grandmother,
Nesime, went to bed one night as a proud, literate woman (not too common
in those days), and woke up the next morning illiterate, since she could not
read the newly adopted Latin alphabet. She resented this theft of her literacy
so much that she refused to learn the new alphabet and used her fingerprint
as her signature until she died. There were many other Nesimes among the
new nation’s masses.12 The masses perceived the top-down modernization
efforts as steps away from their faith.13 Thus, individual and grassroots

SECULARISM: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 235 (Gabriele Marranci ed., 2010) [hereinafter
Yildirim, The Search for Shared Idioms].
6. See generally, M. Hakan Yavuz, ISLAMIC POLITICAL IDENTITY IN TURKEY, Oxford,
2003, 46–48.
7. Kucukcan, supra note 4 at 974–75.
8. See Yildirim, Aftermath of a Revolution, supra note 5, at 347.
9. See Kucukcan, supra note 4, at 963–65.
10. See, e.g., Kucukcan, supra note 4, at 963–65; Hale Yilmaz, Learning to Read (Again): The
Social Experiences of Turkey’s 1928 Alphabet Reform, 43 INT’L J. MIDDLE EAST STUD. 677, 693
(2011).
11. See Yildirim, Aftermath of a Revolution, supra note 5, at 356;
12. Yavuz at 47.
13. Id.
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resistance to many top-down modernization efforts continued.14 For
example, despite decades of state discouragement of religious head
coverings and legal prohibitions against such coverings in public spaces, the
majority of Turkey’s women continue to cover their hair.15
Because Turkish secularism does not preclude state interference in
religious affairs, it has meant different things to different citizens. The
Turkish state oversees religiosity through the Directorate of Religious
Affairs, a government office, whose tasks include the general oversight of all
mosques and the compensation of all Muslim religious personnel.16
Moreover, like their Muslim counterparts, religious minorities are also
subject to state regulation, which has occasionally meant discrimination and
even harassment for these communities.17 For Turkey’s non-Sunni Muslim
populations, at times, life has been just as difficult as for other religious
minorities.18 From the closing of Sufi religious houses as part of the
modernization efforts in the early years of the republic, to ongoing
discrimination of the Alevi population, even Muslim groups who have not
conformed to the state-formulated version of “true Islam” have longed for a
different conceptualization of Turkish secularism.19 Until recently, even
14. See, e.g., Seval Yildirim, Global Tangles: Law, Headcoverings and Religious Identity, 10
SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 45 (2012) [hereinafter Yildirim, Global Tangles] (discussing the history of
Turkish laws prohibiting religious headcoverings in public spaces such as universities and courts).
A recent survey out of the University of Michigan’s Institute for Social Research found that 46% of
Turkish people surveyed believe the less conservative hijab, which fully covers a woman’s hair and
ears but not her face, is the most appropriate attire for public places while 0% prefer a fully-hooded
burqa and 32% believe it is appropriate for a woman to not cover her head at all in public. Jacob
Poushter, How People in Muslim Countries Prefer Women to Dress in Public, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/01/08/what-is-appropriate-attirefor-women-in-muslim-countries/.
15. See Yildirim, Global Tangles, supra note 14, at 54 (citing a 2006 study that showed about
half of Turkish women cover their hair with the number higher in rural areas).
16. See Kucukcan, supra note 4, at 975 (“[C]onstitutional mandates and duties have empowered
the Directorate as a public institution that receives its entire operating budget from the state and
employs approximately some 80,000 people throughout Turkey. The Directorate administers all
mosques in Turkey, trains Imams, and organizes religious courses for young people and adults
during the summer holidays.”). Susanne Gusten, Turkey’s Elephant in the Room: Religious
Freedom, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/29/world/europe/turkeyselephant-in-the-room-religious-freedom.html.
17. For example, the 1700-year-old Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople has come to
the brink of extinction since its seminary in Istanbul was closed down forty years ago, drying up its
source of clergymen. Gusten, supra note 16.
18. See id.
19. See Report Reveals Discrimination Against Turkey’s Alevis, available at http://bianet.org/
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Sunni religious groups have attempted to change the definition of Turkish
secularism to include public expressions of piety, such as the Muslim
headscarf.
Yet other Turkish citizens, those who find religiosity anti-modern,
backward, and contrary to international norms of modernity, have defended
the rigid and fascistic notions of exclusion in the name of upholding
secularism, which, to these citizens, means individual freedoms and
liberties.20 In response, throughout the republican era, the Turkish electorate
has elected parties who identify themselves with Islam. The last in this line
of parties is the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP), or Justice and
Development Party, which was first elected in the 2002 elections, and later
re-elected in 2007 and 2011.21 AKP has successfully redefined Turkish
secularism in some ways, including the effective end of the headscarf ban in
public spaces.22 This shift in what public religious expressions Turkish
secularism would tolerate was starkly evident when four female
parliamentarians attended the parliamentary meeting wearing their
headscarves.23 This was indeed a historic moment for Turkish secularism,
given that, in 1999, another parliamentarian, Merve Kavakci, was not
permitted to take the parliamentarian’s oath while wearing her headscarf.24
In fact, Kavakci was effectively ousted from the Parliament amid much
commotion, and later had her Turkish citizenship revoked on a technicality.25
Finally, AKP demonstrates the difficulty with identifying a political
party as “religious.” Much of the media in Turkey and elsewhere has
identified AKP as an Islamist party.26 AKP has also been promoted as a
english/human-rights/144019-report-reveals-discrimination-against-turkeys-alevis.
20. For my critique of this rigid understanding of secularism as rendering pious Muslims to the
periphery of Turkish society, see Yildirim, The Search for Shared Idioms, supra note 5.
21. Despite the Gezi Park protests and recent corruption charges against various members of the
government, AKP still won most of the seats at local election in late 2013.
See
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/11321558.asp?gid=244 and http://www.aljazeera.com/
news/europe/2014/03/turkish-pm-claims-landslide-election-win-201433072930325489.html.
22. Sebnem Arsu & Dan Bilefsky, Turkey Lifts Longtime Ban on Head Scarves in State Offices,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/09/world/europe/turkey-lifts-ban-onhead-scarves-in-state-offices.html.
23. See Four Turkey MPs Wear Headscarves in Parliament, BBC NEWS (Oct. 31, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24761548.
24. See generally Yildirim, Global Tangles, supra note 14.
25. See generally Yildirim, Global Tangles, supra note 14.
26. Anna Louie Sussman, With Reelection, Turkey’s Islamist Party May Further Consolidate
Power, ATLANTIC (June 12, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/06/with-
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model for “moderate Islam” by the Obama administration, among others.27
Exactly why the electorate should think of AKP as a Muslim or Islamist
party before any other qualifications remains unclear. AKP’s party agenda
is a very progressive one, complete with plans to fully implement Turkey’s
obligations under international human rights regimes.28 This does not mean
that AKP has implemented all the progressive social justice initiatives
outlined in its program, but it shows that the party at least recognizes the
need to include such objectives in their brand. AKP has remained eager for
Turkey to join the European Union; it has amended the Turkish Civil Code
to be more gender-equal, and the Turkish Criminal Code to reflect
progressive court decisions.29 As a result, adultery is no longer a criminal
offense in Turkey.30 Married couples enjoy absolute equality in entry into
marriage, divorce, decision-making during the marriage, and child rearing
and custody.31 Turkey is one of only a few Muslim-majority countries
where sexual minorities are not criminalized. This is not to say that there are
no problems regarding gender and sexual justice in Turkey—there are
numerous and serious issues regarding treatment of both women and sexual
minorities32—but these are remnants of Turkey’s past and not only the
reelection-turkeys-islamist-party-may-further-consolidate-power/240312/; Jonathan Adelman, The
Waning of the Islamic Tide in the Middle East: Just Maybe, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 25, 2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-adelman/the-waning-of-the-islamic_1_b_4589100.html.
27. See, e.g., John Hughes, Turkey is Critical to a More Moderate Islam, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (June 21, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/John-Hughes/2010/0621/
Turkey-is-critical-to-a-more-moderate-Islam; Prime Minister Objects to “Moderate Islam” Label,
HURRIYET DAILY NEWS, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/11360374.asp. Undoubtedly,
using concepts like “moderation” in relationship to a religion is very problematic. It implies that if
not exercised in moderation, there is something inherently flawed or dangerous about the faith.
Another problem is that the term “moderation” is used in relation to certain religion (like Islam)
only. The idea of a moderate Islam or a moderate Muslim is clearly a political (i.e. not a factual)
one born of the Islamophobic narratives particularly dominant after the 9/11 attacks. For a more
detailed argument of this point, see generally Seval Yildirim, Discussing Islam in the Post-9/11
Epistemological Terrain, 19 PACE INT’L L. REV. 223 (2007).
28. Party Programme, AK PARTI, http://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akparti/parti-programme
(last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
29. See Yildirim, Aftermath of a Revolution, supra note 5, at 363–68 (discussing 2002
amendments to the Turkish Civil Code).
30. Owen Bowcott, Turkey Moves Closer to EU After Retreat on Adultery Law, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 24, 2004), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/24/turkey.eu.
31. See Yildirim, Aftermath of a Revolution, supra note 5, at 365–68.
32. See, e.g., John Beck, Turkey’s Violent Homophobia, DAILY BEAST (July 1, 2013),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/07/01/turkey-s-violent-homophobia.html;
Violence
Against Women Still Rampant in Turkey, TODAY’S ZAMAN (Nov. 25, 2013),
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product of AKP policies.33
What is a clear product of the AKP regime is a relentless neoliberal
project, which includes privatization of public assets, urban re-development
projects that seek to demolish vast areas including historic buildings and
parks, and a very permissive atmosphere for foreign direct investment.34
Although these projects might seem desirable to some, various parts of the
Turkish electorate have disagreed. Coupled with AKP’s attempts at
implementing certain conservative laws and regulations (such as time
restrictions on the sale of alcohol in retail stores),35 it was these neoliberal
projects that gave rise to thousands of citizens protesting across Turkey from
late May through July 2013.36 The protests were sparked by the brutal police
attack on a small demonstration protesting the upcoming demolition of a
small park, Gezi Park, at in Istanbul’s Taksim Square.37 The protests
brought together a vast coalition of interests, from the pious group,
Antikapitalist Muslumanlar (Anti-capitalist Muslims), to queer rights
groups, to religious and ethnic minority organizations, to Turkish
nationalists and communists.38 These groups, which otherwise would

http://todayszaman.com/news-332357-violence-against-women-still-rampant-in-turkey.html. Melis
Figanmese, Working to End Violence Against Women in Turkey, HUFFINGTON POST (May 15, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/melis-figanmese/working-to-end-violence_b_3279717.html (citing a
United Nations report from 2011 stating that “39 percent of women in Turkey had suffered physical
violence at some time in their lives, compared with 22 percent in the United States and between 3
and 35 percent in 20 European countries.”). In 2009, a gay honor killing surfaced publicly in Turkey
for the first time. Dan Bilefsky, Soul-Searching in Turkey After a Gay Man Is Killed, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 25, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/26/world/europe/26turkey.html.
33. “While Turkey’s aspiration to join the European Union is pushing the Muslim-inspired
government to accept and even promote civil liberties for women and homosexuals, some
traditionalists remain ill at ease with a permissive attitude toward sexuality and gender roles.”
Bilefsky, supra note 32.
34. See Özlem Onaran & Anastasia Giamali, Authoritarian Neoliberalism Hits a Wall in Turkey,
NEW LEFT PROJECT
(June
6,
2013),
http://www.newleftproject.org/index.php/site/
article_comments/authoritarian_neoliberalism_hits_a_wall_in_turkey (arguing that the primary
problem with the AKP regime is its neoliberalism).
35. Gunes Komurculer, Restrictions on Alcohol Sales Go into Effect Today in Turkey,
HURRIYET DAILY NEWS (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/restrictions-on-alcoholsales-go-into-effect-today-in-turkey.aspx?PageID=238&NID=54074&NewsCatID=344.
36. Constanze Letsch, Turkey Protests Spread After Violence in Istanbul over Park Demolition,
GUARDIAN (May 31, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/31/istanbul-protestersviolent-clashes-police.
37. Id. For the timeline of the protests, see, http://showdiscontent.com/archive/gezi-parki/.
38. Id.
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oppose each other, were instead united in their opposition to AKP.39
Although there were groups that voiced their objections in terms of their
commitment to secularism and in opposition to what they perceived as
AKP’s Islamism, many other groups formulated their grievances as
resistance to AKP’s neoliberal policies or as resistance to capitalism and the
rise of consumerism in Turkey.40 After all, Gezi Park was threatened with
demolition because the AKP government planned to build a state-of-the-art
shopping center and luxury residences in its place.41 Gezi Park thus became
a symbol of resisting a much larger neoliberal project.
Throughout the protests and during AKP’s lifespan, religion has been a
trope used by various sides. AKP uses religious rhetoric and pursues
conservative policies in order to sustain a pious voter base that was
marginalized prior to AKP’s rise to governance. Religious affiliation also
becomes a convenient and effective cover-up for AKP’s neoliberal policies.
Some Turkish circles are content to no longer have their representatives
ousted from Parliament for covering their hair, and in exchange are willing
to overlook the government’s problematic economic policies.
As guilty as AKP is for utilizing religion to further its political and
economic project, its opponents have also employed Islamophobic rhetoric
to convince the public that the pre-AKP era was one of freedoms and
liberties. Moreover, although religion is a primary trope in this discourse, so
is the rhetoric of individual freedoms. The pre-AKP period was one of
military conflict between the armed Kurdish nationalist movement and the
Turkish military.42 It was an oppressive time for various groups, including
pious Muslims who wanted to participate in public life without hiding their
religious identity.43 Turkish history is full of disappearances under police
custody, mistreatment of religious and ethnic minorities, income disparity,
not to mention overt military coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980.44
39. Id. Based on in-person interviews in Turkey during July 2013.
40. See Letsch, supra note 36.
41. See Letsch, supra note 36.
42. AKP has announced efforts to end the Kurdish insurgency, albeit without much progress so
far. Turkey announces reforms to increase Kurdish rights, AL JAZEERA AMERICA (Sep. 30, 2013),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/30/turkey-announcespackageofreformstoincreasekurdish
rights.html.
43. Yildirim, Search for Shared Idioms, supra note 5.
44. See, e.g., Turkey ordered to pay damages 20 years after mly disappearances,
INTERNATIONAL NEWS (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-1-244399Turkey-ordered-to-pay-damages-20-years-after-mly-disappearances.
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The above short history of Turkey’s trials and tribulations dealing with
the state and religion relationship shows that in a relatively young country
like Turkey, perhaps the real issue has little to nothing to do with religiosity
or secularism, but rather with a maturing process riddled with the growing
pains of a young democracy. Our societies would be better served if we
were more reluctant to accept that a clear binary exists between the religious
and the secular. Secularism could imply various possibilities in governance,
and religion is often a trope used for different political projects.
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